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1EMBEDDING HUMAN RIGHTS
IN COUNTERING EXTREMISM: 
REFLECTIONS FROM THE FIELD AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE July 2019
By Dr Katherine E. Brown1, 
Professor Fiona de Londras2 and Jessica White3
Introduction4
Countering Extremism (henceforth CE) programmes 
and policies have been criticised for infringing on hu-
man rights because they are state-centric and security 
orientated in design,5  and because they can have 
unintended disproportionate impacts on rights such 
as those to freedom of expression, assembly, family 
life, and non-discrimination. The expanding remit of 
CE (and counter-terrorism) since 2001, but particularly 
since 2005 in the UK, means that state and security 
agendas now infuse many more areas of ‘ordinary liv-
ing’ than would previously been countenanced,6  with 
disproportionate impact on socio-economically disad-
vantaged parts of society.7  As a consequence CE can 
be ineffective: extremist beliefs regarding state excess 
and victimisation of populations can inadvertently be 
affirmed, extremist behaviours strengthened as the 
state loses trust as the provider of human security 
or wellbeing, and extremist modes of belonging and 
identity normalised. As a result, there are vocal de-
mands for alternative approaches to CE in the United 
Kingdom.8
1 Corresponding Author. Senior Lecturer in Islamic Studies, Department of Theology and Religion, University of Birmingham
2 Chair of Global Legal Studies, Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham.
3 PhD Candidate, Department of Political Science and International Studies, and Theology and Religion.
4 The authors would like to thank G. Rhydian Morgan of Stylus Communication for their logistical and editorial support.
5 Heath-Kelly, C. (2016) ‘Counterterrorism in the NHS: The “Prevent” Strategy Takes to the Clinic’, 13 April, E-International Relations 
http://www.e-ir.info/2016/04/13/counterterrorism-in-the-nhs-the-prevent-strategy-takes-to-the-clinic/. 
The UK is not unique in this, see for example, in relation to the USA - https://www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/why-countering-violent-extrem-
ism-doesn’t-work
6 As argued by Amnesty International over a decade ago: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR45/004/2006/en/ See the claim 
that the UK can now be understood as a ‘counter-terrorist state’ in Blackbourn, J., de Londras, F.  and Morgan, L (2020), Accountability and Re-
view in the Counter-Terrorist State (Bristol: Bristol University Press) forthcoming, on file with authors.
7 For example, Abbas, M. S. (2018) ‘I grew a beard and my dad flipped out!’ Co-option of British Muslim parents in countering ‘extrem-
ism’ within their families in Bradford and Leeds, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2018.1466694 (summarised: 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/the-detrimental-effects-of-current-counter-extremism-measures-on-british-muslim-families).
8 The Together Against Prevent website (2015) lists a wide variety of organisations which have pledged not to cooperate with Prevent.
9 Ethical Approval was received for this research at the University of Birmingham – Reference number ERN_18-1193.
There are two main challenges to unpacking these 
critiques and responding to calls for change. The first is 
recognising ‘how’ CE produces outcomes of this kind, 
and the second is identifying alternatives that may miti-
gate such impacts and produce better outcomes. This 
paper begins to address these two knowledge gaps. It 
does so through utilising expert and practitioner testi-
mony via a small number of interviews (18) and an ex-
pert workshop, as well as a review of existing research 
on countering extremism.9  It proceeds by (a) outlining 
our participants’ general understanding and critiques 
of CE in the UK, (b) drawing out specific critiques 
requiring attention, and (c) proposing the instigation 
of a rights-based approach to CE and of independent 
review of CE activities so that the effectiveness and 
outcomes (including negative societal impact) of CE 
initiatives can be identified through systematic and 
robust independent processes.  
Part 1: Practitioner Perspectives on Existing 
Approaches 
Generally speaking seven domains of CE activity can 
be identified: family & parenting, community, coun-
ter-narratives, policing and criminal justice, human 
2rights, education, and health care.10  Drawing on these 
seven identified sectors, we recruited participants 
across multiple domains in order to achieve rep-
resentation from the different activities that appear to 
constitute CE, ranging from peace building activists, 
to people working in women’s refuges, to HIV+ and 
alcohol addiction support groups. In their public-facing 
materials, the organisations we approaches articulat-
ed an intent to address the beliefs, behaviours, and 
modes of belonging of those groups or individuals who 
are unwilling to share the world with Others.11
Participant Views of What CE is
Each research participant was asked what they under-
stood ‘countering extremism’ to entail, how they under-
stood CE success, what constituted best practice, and 
what barriers, risks and challenges they faced in their 
work. We did not impose definitions upon participants, 
instead following an approach that allowed their un-
derstanding of extremism and their work to drive their 
responses. 
Generally speaking our interviewees considered ‘ex-
tremism’ difficult to define, but believed that it ought to 
be countered. In all but two cases, interviewees con-
sidered that extremism was an attitude or belief that 
can be countered through dialogue, education, and 
exposure to alternative beliefs with trusted interlocu-
tors. This resonates with HMG’s Strategy for Countering 
Extremism (2015) (which defines extremism as “the 
vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, 
including democracy, the rule of law, individual liber-
ty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different 
faiths and beliefs”12) and the most recent articulation 
of CONTEST (which refers to extremism as the 
10 Brown, K. E., (forthcoming) “The Role and Impact of Women’s Influence in Radicalisation and Counter-Radicalisation” (London: I.B. 
Tauris, Bloomsbury); Heath-Kelly, C., (2016) “Algorithmic Auto-immunity in the NHS: Radicalisation and the Clinic”, Security Dialogue 48(1), 
pp. 29-45; and from preliminary findings from the ‘Counterterrorism Curricula in English Schools: Positive and Negative Peace in the War on 
Terror’ project (Max Batley Seedcorn Funding, University of Sheffield).
11 Jose, J. (2015) ‘A Liberalism Gone Wrong? Muscular Liberalism and the Quest for Monocultural Difference’, Social Identities 21(5), 
pp.444–458.
12 Home Office (2015) Counter Extremism Strategy CM9145, (London Crown Copyright),. It is not just the UK with these strategies, see 
also: Australia, ‘Living Safe Together Strategy’ http://www.livingsafetogether.gov.au/pages/home.aspx; Canada, ‘Counter-Extremism Strategy’; 
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrt/cntr-trrrsm/cntrng-vlnt-xtrmsm/index-en.aspx; USA, ‘Department of State and USAID Joint Strategy 
on Countering Violent Extremism’ http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/257913.pdf ; Denmark, ‘A common and safe future https://
www.nyidanmark.dk/NR/rdonlyres/58D048E7-0482-4AE8-99EB-928753EFC1F8/0/a_common_and_safe_future_danish_action_plan_to_pre-
vent_extremism.pdf  accessed 17th April 2019.
13 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest-2018 p.23
14 Ibid. p.23. See also: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/integrated-communities-strategy-green-paper.
15 Ellis, B.H. and Abdil S. (2017) “Building Community Resilience to Violent Extremism through genuine partnerships” American Psy-
chologist 72(3) pp.289-300.
16 Participant 10.
17 We approached over thirty organisations/individuals across a variety of sectors to participate in this work from around the UK. As a 
result, eighteen participated; two stated that they would not engage or legitimise the work of the Commission for Countering Extremism by par-
ticipating in this research; three stated that their work was not relevant, and four did not respond, and three responded but too late for inclusion 
in this research. Participants were from a range of ethnic, religious backgrounds (7 identified as Muslim, 12 men, 6 women, and 9 BME).
“promotion of hatred, the erosion of women’s rights, 
the spread of intolerance, and the isolation of commu-
nities”13). 
Aligning with the CONTEST strategy of attending to 
isolated communities,14 the practitioners we spoke 
to stressed the need to create spaces where persons 
can have contact with non-extremist ideas and with 
‘Others’ in order to create opportunities for extremism 
to be doubted and challenged from within. For these in-
terviewees, offering alternatives to extremism required 
unpacking the concept of ‘the Other’, which meant 
working with and between communities to develop 
bridging, bonding and linking relationships.15 Strong 
alternative narratives that resonated with vulnerable 
groups and were delivered through authentic, credible 
messages were also considered important. So too 
were opportunities to divert energies from possible 
extremist narratives and activities, although only where 
such diversionary activities had meaningful outcomes 
and opportunities for individual or collective success 
built into them. Alternative narratives had to exist in 
spaces where the ‘say-do’ gap was narrowed or where 
the diversionary activities helped to close those gaps. 
Thus, communities and narratives were considered 
very important; we discuss them more below. 
It was noticeable that our interviewees often had a 
narrower vision of CE than the Government’s policies 
suggest. For them, CE did not include addressing 
socio-cultural practices such as FGM, forced marriage, 
or domestic violence. The suggestion was that such a 
definition was too broad; that “We have to specialise in 
something”.16 Organisations that did specialise in such 
work were asked to participate but declined, respond-
ing that their work was not “countering extremism” but 
rather concerned with women’s rights.17 Thus, there 
3appears to be a dissonance between practitioner and 
civil society understanding of CE, and the range of ac-
tivities captured by the Strategy for Countering Extrem-
ism. However, even with participants’ refinement and 
boundary policing of what counted as CE, they were 
each addressing vastly disparate phenomena under 
the label ‘countering extremism’, and it is not clear 
that these phenomena derive from or are sustained 
through the same mechanisms. Some of the partici-
pants thus questioned the utility of linking these areas 
together under the umbrella of CE and E. What partic-
ipants did agree on was that CE was closely linked to 
countering violent extremism (CVE) and counter-terror-
ism. In many of the interviews there was slippage in 
terms, foci and agendas, with many treating CE, CVE, 
and PREVENT work as synonymous. Given the over-
lap in the 2015 and 2017 policy strategies this is not 
surprising. Differentiating these policy and conceptual 
terms has become a process of negotiation about the 
legitimacy of a security and CE logic in particular areas 
of potential state intervention. However, it is interesting 
that in spite of the attempt to pluralise and expand the 
concept of ‘extremism’ through mechanisms such as 
the Strategy for Countering Extremism, for practition-
ers the links between CE, CVE and counter-terrorism 
remain strong suggesting that CE is conceptualised as 
closely connected with security rhetorics.
Participant views of ‘success’ in CE
Practitioners’ definitions of ‘success’ in CE were 
strikingly vague. Many interviewees seemed to define 
success on a micro level, linking it to fulfilment of 
programme objectives (by reference to outputs or out-
comes), reflecting one interviewee’s view that success 
“really depended on what you wanted to achieve”18. 
This idea that project objectives, measurable in out-
puts or outcomes, determined success appeared to 
be linked with the funding and structural conditions of 
civil society,19 with organisations seeking funding for 
specific programmes lasting specific amounts of time 
and required to report on ‘effectiveness’ or success in 
a specifiable, measurable, and quantifiable way. 
18 Participant 7.
19 van Taul, P. and Jordan, L. (2006) NGO Accountability: politics, principles and innovations.  Choudry, A., and Kapoor, D. (2013) NGOi-
zation: complicity, contradictions and prospects. Zed Press. Lang, S. (1997) “The NGOization of Feminism: Transitions, Environments, Transla-
tions”, in Scott, J. W., Kaplan, C. and Keates, D. (eds) Feminism in International Politics (New York: Routledge).
20 We see especially with Channel work, where grievances and vulnerabilities are individualized, the individual is found responsible for 
their vulnerabilities and recovery. This becomes apparent when you view the range of activities in Channel – for some examples please refer to 
Khan, S., McMahon, T. (2016) The Battle for British Islam: Reclaiming Muslim Identity from Extremism (London: Saqi Books). This is also found 
in the language surrounding ‘safeguarding’.
21 Participants 4 and 5. Participant 1 also discussed the idea of ‘abandoned’ and ‘ignored’ communities.
22 Home Office (2016) Building a Stronger Britain https://www.gov.uk/guidance/building-a-stronger-britain-together.
It was thus not surprising that for our interviewees 
success was rarely linked to a grand theory of societal 
change. 
Indeed, interviewees suggested that, much like coun-
ter-radicalisation activities, in practice CE is biased 
towards methodological individualism20 so that suc-
cess was measured according to either the number of 
individuals engaged with or the depth of an individu-
al’s engagement with the programmes delivered. This 
meant that, with the exception of two interviewees, 
altering structural conditions and drivers of extremism 
were not addressed when we asked participants how 
they understood success. The two interviewees who 
did address these stated respectively that in order for 
CE to be successful “real grievances of communities 
and individuals needed to be corrected for”, and that 
“the rise in extremism cannot be untangled from aus-
terity measures”.21  However, in practice, neither these 
individuals nor the organisations for which they worked 
tackled these structural and material factors in their 
CE efforts.
Participant views of the role of ‘community’ in CE
Despite this methodological individualism, CE is often 
focused on “community”. The linkage between CE and 
“working with communities” derives from early PRE-
VENT-funded initiatives and results in a wide range of 
initiatives such as women’s empowerment activities, 
interfaith dialogue, sporting events, youth work, ex-
tremism awareness raising, and resilience building be-
ing encompassed in the rubric of CE. These types of CE 
activities occur through a range of local authority, civil 
society, entrepreneur and philanthropic organisations. 
They are currently being promoted and supported by 
Baroness Williams’ Building a Stronger Britain Togeth-
er (BSBT) programme.22 BSBT provides two types of 
funding for organisations working in particular areas: 
project funding and ‘support in kind’. 
This approach reflects the counter-terrorism and 
securitised framing of extremism as both a cause and 
consequence of “isolated communities” (as seen in 
CONTEST). A number of local authority strategies (such 
4as Leeds, Luton and Lewisham) assert that they will 
“build more cohesive communities” in order to respond 
to the challenge of extremism.23
Our interviewees stressed the importance of “working 
with” not “to” communities, i.e. of creating “bottom 
up” initiatives where possible.24 However, interviewees 
reported that the legacy of counter-terrorism engage-
ment, institutional racism in police forces, ambiguity 
and overlap between local authority PREVENT leads’ 
and counter-extremisms leads’ roles, and a “hostile en-
vironment” for immigrants, means that there is some 
resistance and distrust regarding such community 
focused activities.25 As one interviewee stated: “Ordi-
nary people don’t understand the distinction between 
government funding projects – they just associate pro-
gram directives with being spied on”.26  Our interview-
ees noted that overcoming this hostility and rebuilding 
trust required them to rely on their personal authority, 
build relationships, lean on established networks, facil-
itate and support communities in other fields, and be 
constantly available and present. 
In spite of the challenge clearly posed to the estab-
lishment of trust with communities, our interviewees 
were of the view that community oriented approaches 
are important, and especially that they can address 
extremist beliefs by addressing individual components 
of extremist ideology. In this respect interviewees 
noted the usefulness of challenging victimhood nar-
ratives, offering communities opportunities to engage 
with PREVENT leads or the police or local councils in 
open forums, or challenging the exclusivist narratives 
of extremists by showing mutual shared interests 
across communities. For our interviewees, community 
orientated CE work addressed extremist behaviours 
by, for example, offering alternative activities if extrem-
ist groups were marching in their towns, or offering 
everyday alternative activities that channelled young 
23 Local Government Association “Special Interest Group – Countering Extremism” https://www.local.gov.uk/sigce; see also: https://www.
leeds.gov.uk/residents/neighbourhoods-and-community/prevent; Lewisham Council (2018) Update on Counter Extremism http://councilmeet-
ings.lewisham.gov.uk/documents/s55623/10UpdateonCounterExtremismStrategy070318.pdf; See also “Luton in Harmony” http://lutoninharmo-
ny.co.uk and https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/663/luton-borough-council-special-interest-group-to-tackle-far-right-ex-
tremism.
24 Participants 7, 11 and 12. This approach is also promoted by Hargreaves, J. (2018) “Towards a Cure for Prevent? Building Re-
silience to Religious and Political Forms of Violence within British Muslim Communities” Journal of Muslims in Europe 7(2) https://doi.
org/10.1163/22117954-12341372.
25 Participant 4 and 12 talked specifically about ‘hostile environments’.
26 Participant 16.
27 Home Office (2015) Counter Extremism Strategy CM9145 (London: Crown Copyright) https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/gov-
ernment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf page 5. See also House of Commons and House 
of Lords Joint Committee on Human Rights Counter Extremism: Second Report of Session 2016-2017 HLC Paper 39, HC 105 (London: Crown 
Copyright) https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201617/jtselect/jtrights/105/105.pdf.
28 Brown, K. E. (2017) “RAN Narratives and Counter-Narratives Best Practices” in RAN Best Practices, Chapter. 7. DJ Home, European 
Union. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices_en.
people’s energy for change and engagement. Modes 
of extremist belonging were challenged through these 
activities by breaking down divisions across communi-
ties through shared activities, interfaith dialogue, and 
facilitating everyday contact with those of other com-
munities via business breakfasts, trade unions, and 
council meetings. 
Participants’ views of Counter-Narratives
Reflecting the Government’s view that “terrorism is 
really a symptom; ideology is the root cause”,27  much 
of CE is premised on the importance of winning ‘hearts 
and minds’, leading to a flurry of interventions and 
efforts to build and promote both ‘counter-narra-
tives’ and ‘alternative-narratives’.28 Our interviewees 
reinforced the view that such activity should occur 
both on- and off-line, but suggested that government 
engagement with such efforts may affirm extremist 
narratives of government spying, propaganda, and 
social and religious engineering with unanticipated 
negative outcomes. Interestingly participants suggest-
ed that this is common ground for far right, far left 
and Islamist-inspired extremist groups. Nevertheless 
counter-narrative and alternative narrative approaches 
are at the centre of much of what our participants do. 
These self-identified ‘frontline’ workers push back at 
claims that they are government ‘stooges’. Participants 
identified independence as being essential to their 
credibility and, for some, a moral imperative when en-
gaged in this work. For some participants this meant, 
for example, that they would not accept any govern-
ment funding.
Counter narrative approaches best target the beliefs 
and ideologies of extremist groups. It is worth noting, 
as one interviewee did, that counter narratives chal-
lenge extremist modes of belonging, but also tradition-
al ideas of community when such efforts are encoun-
5tered in the digital and social media realm.29  Online 
counter-narrative efforts include the distribution and 
co-production of content with communities and NGOs, 
emphasising different stories and facts to connect 
with both those being targeted by extremist groups 
and those inadvertently encountering extremism. 
Counter-narratives also operate to challenge extremist 
behaviours by calling into question the need for and 
likelihood of success of violence, and by suggesting al-
ternative modes of political engagement. In this arena, 
interviewees stressed the importance of profession-
al-looking content that resonated emotionally as well 
as factually, and of tracking engagement beyond the 
number of “clicks”.30  Counter-narrative work is also a 
large component of ‘off-line’ CE efforts, through human 
rights promotion, empowerment activities, diversity 
and multiculturalism, all of which provide powerful 
normative and empirical challenges to extremist re-
sistance to sharing the world with Others. These were 
particularly emphasised for those working with young 
people, including in schools. In some interviews CE 
was seen as “future-proofing” against extremism, while 
other practitioners resisted this idea saying it is not 
possible to successfully “inoculate” against extremism, 
because “like viruses, it mutates… we’ve been treating 
extremism as a disease, but it acts more like a virus”.31 
 
Part 2: Specific Challenges Emerging from 
Participant Perspectives
From the empirical data gathered for this paper, we 
have drawn out three specific sets of challenges, which 
we term (i) design and philosophical challenges, (ii) 
policy challenges, and (iii) implementation challenges.
Design and Philosophical Challenges: The Coercive Nature 
of CE
In many cases, our research participants considered 
that CE has coercive effects, especially for minority and 
disadvantaged sectors of society whose existing expe-
riences of discrimination and differentiation may be 
exacerbated in the CE domain,32  but that the coercive 
nature of CE is neither identified for accounted for in 
CE design and implementation. 
29 See also Brown, K. E. and Pearson, E. (2017) “The Online-world, Social Media and Terrorism” in Andrew Silke (ed.), Handbook of 
Terrorism and Counter-terrorism. (Abingdon: Routledge).
30  Participant 5.
31  Participant 17.
32 Heath-Kelly, C. (2018) “Is Counter-radicalization an Effective Counterterrorist Tool?: NO” in Contemporary Debates on Terrorism, 2nd 
Edition, edited by Richard Jackson & Daniela Pisoiu (Abingdon: Routledge).
33 Europol (2016) TE-SAT 2016: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report.(The Hague: European Police Office (Europol)).
34 Participant 9.
Participants identified three factors that mean CE is 
properly understood as coercive. 
First, the broader policy context in which CE occurs is 
a coercive one including the ‘hostile environment’ for 
immigrants, the securitisation of other policy fields, 
community co-option, and ‘deception’.33  Thus, while 
some CE initiatives such as parenting classes may not 
seem coercive per se, when implemented in this broad-
er policy context they can be experienced as such, 
especially in communities that are (or perceive them-
selves to be) heavily surveilled. Furthermore, putative 
participants may question the extent to which ‘volun-
tary’ programmes are truly voluntary (thus implicating 
their consent to this engagement with the state or 
state proxies), and communities may experience ‘sup-
portive’ interventions as being infantilising. While such 
initiatives may have positive and welcome outcomes, 
their effectiveness and legitimacy, and their impact on 
future activities, may be limited because of the context 
from which they emerge and in which they operate. As 
one interviewee said “there is a paradox in trying to im-
plement something that almost entirely relies on trust, 
through a programme that subverts trust… there must 
be a way to overcome this”.34 
Second, where CE initiatives are couched in or inter-
sect with legal or quasi-legal instruments, their source 
may make them coercive. This is mostly felt at the indi-
vidual level where ‘consent’ is not freely given and the 
consequences for not agreeing to participate are high. 
For example, participation in Channel is per se volun-
tary but a refusal to participate can be followed by, for 
example, the initiation of child welfare proceedings in 
respect of children in the non-participant’s care. Thus, 
Channel intersects with a non-voluntary and heavily 
interventionist legal regime that means its operation is 
de facto coercive even if de jure voluntary. 
Third, the second order consequences of CE efforts 
can result in outcomes that relate directly to legal pro-
cesses, or consequences with clearly coercive effects. 
For example counter extremism concerns influence 
family court proceedings and passport seizures, even 
where there is no related established criminal or civil 
law violation. 
6Thus, CE is properly understood as coercive in practice. 
That insight has significant design and philosophical 
implications because it makes clear the risks of rights 
violations that may flow from even benign-seeming CE 
interventions. Thus, the threshold for engaging with dif-
ferent CE initiatives should be determined by reference 
to the coerciveness of the potential intervention, so 
that interventions that are only minimally coercive (e.g. 
parenting classes) would have a very low threshold for 
intervention (e.g. self-selection by a parent), whereas 
interventions that have high coercive potential (e.g. 
invitations to engage with Channel) would have very 
high thresholds for intervention (e.g. legal advice for 
the potential participant about the implications of non/
engagement). Such an approach would contribute to 
ensuring that CE is limited and restrained, in-keeping 
with its coercive nature.
Design and Philosophical Challenges: Presenting Counter-
Narratives
A second philosophical and design challenge is that 
the alternatives to extremist narratives and agendas 
are difficult to place in easily digestible and glossy 
forms. While extremist narratives rely on Utopian and 
often-authoritarian politics that insist upon a singu-
lar exclusive account of history, the present, and the 
future, alternatives and counter arguments must 
necessarily resist that logic or structure of argument. 
Instead they need to embrace complexity, risk, and 
ambiguity. Otherwise the ‘alternative’ or ‘counter’ is no 
less extreme than what it seeks to oppose. This means 
that diverse, contradictory, oppositional and fragment-
ed alternatives need to be promoted and encountered 
to fully challenge extremisms.35  Moreover these may 
also be alternatives that are not fully supported by the 
state. 
Given CE narratives need to be non-coercive, consen-
sual, and diverse then this raises the question of the 
appropriate and legitimate role of government and 
state agencies in CE. Arguably instead of providing 
content or form to CE efforts, the role of government 
should be to create the environment in which CE can 
occur. In line with the as laid out in the UN’s Strategy 
for Preventing Violent Extremism (2015), the duty of 
government is to redress the drivers of and conditions 
conducive to extremism, not to craft narratives to ‘fix 
for’ particular extremisms. 
35 As Laclau and Mouffe write, “without conflict and division, a pluralist democratic politics would be impossible” Laclau E, Mouffe, C. 
(2014) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. 2nd edition (London: Verso) pp.xvii–xviii.
36 Participant 18.
37 Participant 10.
In such a guise, Government becomes a facilitator for 
civil society CE actions thus engaging in more effective 
and more restrained CE activity.
Policy Challenges: The Expansiveness of CE
A key observation that emerged from the expert 
meeting is that although the definition of extremism is 
contested, positive and meaningful CE contributions 
can exist where it is locally understood and deter-
mined. The local understandings of CE found in the 
interviews were very specific, and showed that for CE 
to work it needs to be framed as addressing something 
more detailed than ‘extremism’ per se, perhaps being 
fragmented into extremist behaviours, anti social be-
haviour, political violence, hate crime or other relevant 
elements as appropriate to the a particular context. 
By eschewing the highly generalised notion of ‘CE’ 
and focusing on manifestations extremism in practice, 
interviewees reported that they were able to generate 
greater connections between policies, interventions 
and outcomes.
However even at the local level there was also a need 
to understand what differentiates extremist occurrenc-
es of these problematic behaviours from non-extremist 
occurrences. This was important for recognising that 
while the outcomes or outward manifestations of these 
behaviours are similar, the underlying drivers and moti-
vations may not be, and therefore that the solutions to 
these behaviours are not necessarily the same. As one 
interviewee put it “they’re like false friends from an-
other language, they look like the same thing and you 
know what they mean, but they’re not and you don’t.”36 
This meant, they argued, and as was reflected in other 
interviews and desk research, that CE had an expan-
sive agenda; it has become ‘the solution’ to everyone’s 
problems, but can’t actually solve for them.
“CVE programming, that is PREVENT, has been copied 
and pasted into issues like knife crime – a mindless re-
cycling of programming  that hasn’t been proven yet”37 
This suggests that, paradoxically to the claims of spec-
ificity, CE is encountering a kind of enforced mission 
creep rather than being used to address extremism 
directly. This is linked to the idea that extremist be-
haviours, beliefs, and modes of belonging can explain 
other social harms and violence, thus pursuing an es-
sentialist and securitised notion of CE. For some of our 
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ter-extremism; to attempts to use CE to try to ‘fix’ things 
that are really manifestations of state and democratic 
failures (e.g. the collapse of meaningful welfare provi-
sion, or disengagement from democratic politics). This 
relates to the broader context of coercion in which CE 
is practiced including the failure to enact human rights 
as positive obligations of the state, austerity, the dis-
mantling of the welfare state, systemic and persistent 
inequality, and the failure to commit to and resource a 
vision of substantive equality.
“We accept that Extremism and Counter Extremism is 
part of the full spectrum of human experiences and 
connects to those… so there must be a full range of 
interventions”38 
This suggests that better understanding is needed of 
how existing systems (such as the criminal law and 
welfare provision) might contribute to addressing both 
extremist and non-extremist beliefs and behaviours. 
This should be accompanied by objective situation 
assessment to ascertain whether CE is the appropriate 
approach in a particular case or context, or whether 
the existing instruments and systems such as the 
criminal law, in which human rights are ‘built in’, might 
be sufficient. Should such an approach be taken, CE 
would be a supplementary or ‘gap-filling’ domain, oper-
ating only where other, coercive (e.g. criminal justice) 
and non-coercive (e.g. welfare) policy approaches are 
inadequate or inappropriate.
Implementation Challenges: Effectiveness, Funding, and 
‘Enthusiastic Experts’
By focusing on specifying extremist harms and differ-
entiating these from non-extremist harms (as rec-
ommended above), practitioners and policy makers 
should be able to move past circular debates on defin-
ing extremism and instead to engage meaningfully in 
ascertaining what CE is, what it is for, what its objec-
tives are, and what systematic frameworks to achieve 
these objectives may be needed. At present there is 
scant evidence of any such analysis, so that the goals 
and objectives of CE per se are hard to ascertain. As a 
result, it is not clear how effectiveness is or should be 
understood in the CE context, how it can be measured, 
and what ends CE programmes and policies are intend-
ed to serve. CE programmes may produce social goods 
and reduce social harms not directly related to extrem-
ism, but which may incidentally or in correlation lead 
to a decrease in extremism. However, the connections 
38 Participant 5.
between activities, policies, programmes and desired 
outcomes are largely anecdotal and under theorised. 
The desired ‘end state’ of CE is often unclear, yet when 
it is articulated it is generally framed according to a 
state-security agenda. This reinforces a misalignment 
between the goals and objectives of the state (en-
hanced (national) security), and those of local provid-
ers (addressing local community challenges). Thus, it is 
not always clear what objectives a programme should 
be oriented towards, or how to assess the ‘fuzzy’ im-
pacts that it has had which may have almost immeas-
urable implications for countering extremism.
However, as already noted, the funding and civil society 
structures in which CE is often delivered are not gener-
ally set up to account for such hard-to-capture potential 
outcomes. Rather, civil society often deals in short-
term funding structures, needing to propose tightly 
designed programmes with measureable outcomes, 
and then able to deliver them only for a funded peri-
od of time. As well as impacting on the design of CE 
programmes, these pragmatic realities can also mean 
that funding gaps arise and that trust and relation-
ships have to be rebuilt at the start of each project so 
that projects struggle to build on past activities, and 
as a result may deliver only surface level interventions. 
This structure may result in providers and practition-
ers focusing on delivering measurable micro-objec-
tives of the project (how many outputs, contacts etc.) 
as opposed to macro-objectives of CE, exaggerating 
successes and overpromising outcomes (to secure 
future funding), and reinforcing out-dated stereotypes 
(misalignment and misidentification of social harms 
to extremism). Additionally the focus on measuring 
micro-objectives means that inadvertent and unintend-
ed outcomes may not be measured or recognised (e.g. 
societal and rights impacts) and thus that we may not 
know about potential counter-productiveness of inter-
ventions in non-target populations, or in out-groups 
etc… This lack of knowledge is not simply because 
there is a lack of appropriate research (a frequent 
complaint in this field), but because knowledge about 
the ‘outcomes’ and ‘impacts’ of CE is scaled to that of 
the delivery provider, local milieu, or particular project 
type. This makes broader claims about CE difficult to 
substantiate.
Reflecting these challenges, our interviews suggest 
that CE interventions and practitioners often have 
unclear theories of change, and are not sure about 
whether they are seeking resistance, resilience, or the 
elimination of extremism. This suggests that a radical 
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so that macro-objectives can be developed for CE per 
se. Furthermore, while individual programmes can 
measure the impact they have had in terms of small-
scale outcomes and outputs, there are problems 
with generalizability and scalability to demonstrate 
the overall effectiveness of CE interventions and to 
connect individual projects or interventions with the 
achievement of the broader objectives of CE per se. In 
part this is because there is a challenge in demonstrat-
ing causality, as opposed to correlation, due to weak 
theories of change that are only loosely linked to clear 
ideas of what extremism is. 
A third implementation challenge stems from the need 
for CE practitioners to have local relationships, net-
works and trust in order to be perceived as legitimate 
and to be effective (even on their own terms).  The con-
sequence is that some interviewees saw themselves 
as “accidental CE providers,”39   in other words they 
were either asked to deliver CE activities, or sought out 
CE funding to fund existing (albeit amended) projects, 
or were local activists who were co-opted into the CE 
space. The consequence is that only two of the inter-
viewees had any formal training or qualifications relat-
ed to extremism or terrorism. This suggests that much 
knowledge about CE is experiential, functional and 
technical, rather than critical, reflexive or emancipa-
tory. As one interviewee put it, in many cases CE is “En-
thusiasm without expertise”.40  Questions arise about 
how well trained people involved in CE are, whether 
they are themselves safe-guarded, and whether their 
interventions are appropriate to the situation. This has 
particular consequences when these groups are pro-
viding training to other professional groups regarding 
radicalisation, extremism and safeguarding. 
On the one hand, the involvement of persons without 
expertise but with good faith in CE reflects the CE and 
counter-terrorism responsibilisation of a broad range 
of actors across both the public and private sphere. 
Without appropriate training, this responsibilisation 
may have unintended and counter-productive con-
sequences. On the other hand, relying on state-led 
interventions alone results in the over securitisation 
of CE provision, and may be counterproductive given 
the need for trust and local connectivity. Reflecting 
on this dilemma, different interviewees discussed the 
need for empathy and understanding, noting that this 
39 Participant 15.
40 Participant 9.
41 Participant 6.
42 United Nations Secretary General (2015) Plan of Action for Preventing Violent Extremism A/70/674 https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674.
was needed not only as an outcome of CE (because 
these break down barriers between communities) but 
also as the process of CE. To create this, a consensus 
emerged from interviewees that all parties need to 
communicate their objectives, ideas of success, and 
what they saw as their responsibilities in the CE. This 
requires a degree of self-awareness and reflexivity, as 
well as a willingness to engage with partners in a world 
of distrust and suspicion. In other words, trust building 
was acknowledged as a complex and oftentimes tacit 
and unstated component of successful CE activities. 
The outcome was a recommendation from practition-
ers and the expert workshop that CE should be built 
around conditional trust, empathetic cooperation and 
reflexivity.
Part 3: A Human Rights Based CE
As already outlined, the views and experiences of 
our research participants identified important critical 
shortfalls in how CE is conceptualised, delivered, and 
measured. If CE is understood as being oriented to-
wards achieving large-scale societal change (reduction 
in extremism) as well as individual results (diversion of 
individual from extremism), this has important implica-
tions or its effectiveness. Reflecting this, we propose 
two significant changes in how CE is pursued; first 
that CE should be reoriented to be rights based, and 
second that CE should be subjected to systematic inde-
pendent review in order to ensure legitimacy, account-
ability, and proportionality in CE. 
“Embed our responses to Extremism in human rights, 
pluralism and equalities, give opportunities for other 
ideas and voices“41
As has been acknowledged by practitioners, experts 
and in the literature review the current system of CE 
in the UK does not have human rights as a core de-
sign principle. Rather the core design principle is that 
of state security. This is problematic as the UN Plan 
of Action for Preventing Violent Extremism highlights 
weak human rights governance and rule of law as a 
key driver for extremism.42  A weakened state of human 
rights protection and rule of law facilitates extremism, 
while their presence affirms and strengthens resilience 
to extremism and minimises opportunities for extrem-
ism to take hold. This is not merely a concern for “other 
countries”, but is one the UK must take seriously given 
9the international criticisms levied at domestic CE poli-
cies and programmes for infringing upon and minimis-
ing human rights commitments,43  as well as percep-
tions of rights infringement among some in ‘suspect 
communities’. 
Making human rights protection a design principle of 
CE would refocus CE towards the needs of society and 
individuals, while also encouraging state restraint and 
accountability. This would be supported by our second 
recommendation to introduce independent review of 
CE. Human rights express the notion that everyone 
possesses a set of individual entitlements that protect 
and promote the core aspects of our well-being, and 
“recognise and give substance to our equal intrinsic 
worth…we possess them independently of any other 
badge of demarcation, be it gender, race, age, religious 
or other belief, sexual orientation, etc.”44  In other 
words, at the heart of human rights is a willingness 
and commitment to share the world with others: the 
opposite of extremism. 
Instantiating a human rights-based approach to CE
We propose that instantiating a rights-based approach 
to CE requires three steps: 
i. upholding and promoting dignity, equality and 
rights in CE; 
ii. ensuring inclusive design, implementation and 
evaluation of CE;
iii. to committing to ‘do no harm’ through CE.
Upholding and promoting dignity, equality and rights in 
CE would place both adherence to human rights law 
obligations and a disposition that seeks to sustain the 
underlying values of dignity and rights in and through 
CE. At the core of this is the principle of non-discrim-
ination. Reponses to extremism ought not dispropor-
tionally to impact particular racial, ethnic, religious or 
other groups, and racial or religious profiling in both CE 
and policing or law enforcement must be avoided. Un-
derstanding and addressing endemic discrimination, 
particularly within law enforcement and the criminal 
43 For example see the ruling on Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom (applications nos. 58170/13, 62322/14 and 
24960/15), ECHR 299 (2018); HRC (2016) Observations of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the 
report of the Inquiry carried out by the Committee under article 6 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention-Advance Unedited Version CRP-
D/C/17/R.3. OCHCR. Geneva; HRC (2017) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association 
on his follow-up mission to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland A/HRC/35/28/Add.1, http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/
dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/35/28/Add.1.
44 Greer, S. (2018) “How Might human rights contribute to countering extremism in the UK” University of Bristol Law School Blog. 
https://legalresearch.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2018/10/how-might-human-rights-contribute-to-countering-extremism-in-the-uk/.
45 Drawing on International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Article 19(3); European Convention on Human Rights Article 15.
46 Participant 1.
justice system, is critical to understanding how seem-
ingly benign CE interventions may be experienced as 
or lead to the undermining of dignity, equality, and the 
enjoyment of human rights . All interferences with and 
limitation of human rights must be lawful, i.e. must be 
enacted in accordance with law, serve a legitimate pur-
pose, be proportionate, and be necessary to achieve 
that identified purpose.45 
Ensuring inclusive and meaningful design, implementa-
tion and evaluation of CE would better protect the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination in CE. Moreover by bringing 
‘local’ knowledge and experience to bear in all stages 
it is possible to identify and mitigate potential rights- 
and equality-based resistance to planned or proposed 
CE interventions. Thus, CE policies and programmes 
should be ‘locally owned’, so that local communities 
can identify their needs and set CE agendas designed 
to address them, rather than assuming that the state 
or local authority ‘knows best’. To have an inclusive 
policy and programme also means that representation 
and participation should be sought from the widest 
possible range of members within a community – in-
cluding those marginalised within it – such as LGBTQI+ 
religious community members, young women, or disa-
bled persons. Additionally, in the design and implemen-
tation of programmes the diverse needs of different 
sections of communities should be addressed and any 
barriers eliminated so that, for example, appropriate 
steps are taken to ensure that caring responsibilities 
(including childcare), literacy and language proficiency, 
shift work patterns, disability access, and the specific 
concerns and needs of minorities within communities 
do not act as barriers to participation.
“why is this prevention space exceptionalised 
and taken apart from other social harms?”46
Designing CE according to a ‘do no harm’ principle 
aims to avoid exposing people to additional risks 
through CE activities by ensuring that potential neg-
ative effects of a CE intervention on social fabric, 
economy, and environment are mitigated or avoided. 
This approach recognises that CE does not operate 
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in a vacuum, and has a range of second-order (and 
often unintended) effects.47  To do no harm requires a 
human rights sensitive situational assessment and a 
clearly articulated theory of change for any CE pro-
gramme, policy or intervention. These two planning 
and design tools are vital for ensuring that necessary 
thresholds for intervention are met, and for under-
standing how and where interventions have an effect 
in countering extremism, and their relationships to 
other human rights. Maintaining a do no harm principle 
also offers a degree of accountability in practice as it 
shifts the operational focus to the intended targets of 
policies and programmes rather than perceived bene-
fits to the state.
Independent, Evaluative Mechanism of Countering 
Extremism Policies and Programmes
At present, CE is undertaken on multiple scales, and 
under a variety of regulatory frameworks including the 
Strategy on Countering Extremism, Prevent, the Pre-
vent Duty imposed under the Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Act 2015, and the Channel process as revised 
by the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. 
Our interviews suggest that, notwithstanding the mul-
tiple different frameworks and sources of countering 
extremism work in a formal sense, in practice when 
undertaking ‘everyday’ countering extremism practi-
tioners do not necessarily distinguish between these, 
until and unless formal referrals and reporting are re-
quired. This intermingling in practice makes evaluation 
and monitoring of CE programmes, policies and prac-
titioners challenging because it is not always possible 
47 For example, earlier research has shown how framing universities’ as ‘radicalising spaces’, and subsequent attempts to combat extrem-
ism on campuses has been linked to increases in Islamophobia, a scapegoating of faith based students societies, and fears for some families that 
children will be suspected of being radical/radicalized and therefore being less supportive of continuing in higher education.  Please see a range of 
publications: https://gtr.ukri.org/project/359DFD05-5543-4A69-8A6E-F7857B16EE14; and Brown, K.E. and Saeed, T. (2015) “Radicalization and 
Counter-Radicalization at British Universities: Encounters and Alternatives” Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies 38 (11) pp.1952-1968; Saeed, T. 
(2016) Islamophobia and Securitization: religion, ethnicity and the female voice (Basginstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
48 See for example Rights Watch UK, Preventing Education? Human Rights and UK Counter-Terrorism Policy in Schools (Rights Watch 
UK 2016); Busher J. et. al. (2017), What the Prevent Duty Means for Schools and Colleges in England: An Analysis of Educationalists’ Experi-
ences; Muslim Council of Britain, (2015) ‘Meeting between David Anderson QC and the MCB: Concerns on Prevent’ https://www.mcb.org.uk/
wp-content/uploads/2015/10/20150803-Case-studies-about-Prevent.pdf ; British Muslims for Secular Democracy, (2017) Democracy, Integra-
tion and Freedom in the Age of Prevent: Report; https://www.bmsd.org.uk/democracy-integration-and-freedom-in-the-age-of-prevent-report/ 
; Malik, N. (2019) Radicalising Our Children An Analysis Of Family Court Cases Of British Children At Risk Of Radicalisation, 2013-2018 
(Henry Jackson Society Centre on Radicalisation and Terrorism, London); Webb, E. (2017) For Our Children: An Examination of Prevent in the 
Curriculum, (HJS Centre for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism Policy Paper No. 10); Sutton, R. (2016) Myths and Misunderstandings: 
Understanding Opposition to The Prevent Strategy, (Centre for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism); CAGE (2018) ‘Separating Fami-
lies: How PREVENT Seeks the Removal of Children’ https://www.cage.ngo/product/separating-families-how-prevent-seeks-the-removal-of-chil-
dren-report; JUST Yorkshire, (2017) Rethinking Prevent: A Case for an Alternative Approach http://rethinkingprevent.org.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2017/09/Rethinking-Prevent-A-Case-for-an-Alternative-Approach-v1.04.pdf; Open Society Justice Initiative (2016), Eroding Trust: The 
UK’s PREVENT Counter-Extremism Strategy in Health and Education (Open Society Foundations https://www.justiceinitiative.org/publications/
eroding-trust-uk-s-prevent-counter-extremism-strategy-health-and-education; Index on Censorship (2018), Uncomfortable but Educational: 
Freedom of Expression in UK Universities, https://www.indexoncensorship.org/uncomfortable-educational-freedom-expression-uk-universities/.
49 For example Home Office (2017), Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2015 to March 2016 
Statistical Bulletin 23/17 (Crown Copyright, London); Home Office (2018), Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent Pro-
gramme, April 2016 to March 2017 Statistical Bulletin 06/18 (Crown Copyright, London); Home Office (2019), Individuals referred to and 
supported through the Prevent Programme, April 2017 to March 2018 Statistical bulletin 31/18 (Crown Copyright, London); HM Government 
(2015), CONTEST The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism Annual Report (Cm 9048); HM Government (2016), CONTEST The 
United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism Annual Report (Cm 9310).
to separate out and delineate causal, correlative or 
independent variables/indicators/activities in CE. 
Furthermore, extensive existing research, including 
that undertaken by civil society organisations, suggests 
that there is some distrust or uncertainty about the 
regulatory frameworks, motivating logics, reporting, 
transparency and rights respectfulness of countering 
extremism generally, and Prevent in particular.48  This 
is a significant challenge given that—as our interview-
ees attested—co-working, trust, relationships, commu-
nity engagement, and esteem are critical resources.
In part, this distrust or anxiety emanates from con-
cerns—already outlined above—that (i) counter extrem-
ism activities result in violations of legally protected 
human rights, including rights to privacy, education, 
assembly, expression, and non-discrimination; (ii) 
counter-extremism activities are ineffective and have 
unintended societal impacts with negative effects for 
long-term and sustainable security; and (iii) there is a 
lack of political willingness meaningfully to review and 
revisit the current approach to countering extremism, 
and thus to address their potentially deleterious rights, 
society and security impacts. 
While these programmes and approaches may well be 
subjected to internal review processes in sponsoring 
departments, particularly the Home Office, and while 
annual reporting (primarily statistical) is undertaken 
in respect of some programmes (especially Prevent),49  
there is no formal mechanism by which a commitment 
to accountability, transparency, and reflexivity can be 
11
instantiated through evaluative, rights-based review.50  
We therefore propose the establishment of a stand-
ing mechanism for independent review of countering 
extremism. 
The Principles for Independent Review
Building on research of effective review in the coun-
ter-terrorism field, and adjusting that to countering 
extremism, we propose that the following principles for 
review ought to be pursued:
(i) Independence
The reviewer ought to be independent; she ought to be 
appointed in accordance with the principles and codes 
of public appointments, have relevant expertise (es-
pecially analytical skills, and expertise in law, human 
rights, or countering extremism), and be reasonably 
considered non-partisan.
(ii) Mandate
The reviewer ought to have a clear mandate for a 
mixture of compelled periodic reviews (i.e. reviews 
of certain programmes or policies) and self-initiated 
reviews (similar to the Independent Reviewer of Ter-
rorism Legislation). Provided she remains within the 
bounds of her mandate, the reviewer should be able to 
set her own work programme. The mandate or terms of 
reference should be set out clearly and published. The 
mandate or terms of reference might be statutory.
The mandate should include assessing and reporting 
on (a) the frequency and use of relevant statutory 
provisions, (b) prevalence and nature of countering 
extremism activity, (c) effectiveness assessed against 
the overall objective of the countering extremism 
strategy and against the specific objective of reviewed 
programmes, and (d) societal impact including human 
rights compliance, legality, and societal acceptance.
(iii) Access to Information
The reviewer should have access to all relevant infor-
mation and should, therefore, have appropriate secu-
rity authorisations and clearance. All government and 
local government authorities, and relevant non-state 
providers, should cooperate fully with all requests for 
information. 
50 See further Blackbourn, J., de Londras, F., Morgan L, (2020), Accountability and Review in the Counter-Terrorist State (Bristol: Bristol 
University Press), forthcoming (on file with authors), Introduction and Chapter 4.
51 Participant 2.
(iv) Meaningful Participation
Review ought to be premised on a policy of meaning-
ful participation reflected in the establishment of a 
consultative or advisory group with community and civil 
society representation, empowerment of the reviewer 
to consult with impacted communities, and an expecta-
tion that such consultation would take place.
(v) Publication
Reviews ought to be published within a reasonable 
time, with any redactions being explained in the pub-
lished text. Published reviews ought to be laid before 
Parliament in a timely manner, and Government ought 
to be compelled to report to Parliament on it response 
to the review in a reasonable time, including indicating 
the action that will be taken pursuant to any recom-
mendations made or, if no action is foreseen, explain-
ing the decision not to implement recommendations.  
Concluding Remarks
“Policy must be forward-facing; they cannot undo what 
has been done or give up CE”51 
The objectives of this research paper have been to 
establish the benefits and challenges of existing ap-
proaches, and on the basis of these to suggest alter-
natives. The paper identifies that the majority of work 
in CE is carried out at the local and community level, 
and is concerned with addressing extremist narratives 
and ideologies. The paper further determined that the 
challenges and risks with the existing approaches are 
political and philosophical, institutional and functional. 
The normative and practical alternatives are rooted 
in human rights principles. We therefore recommend 
reframing CE towards human rights as both a pro-
cess and an “end-state”, propose a set of guidelines 
to achieve this, and propose the establishment of an 
independent evaluative review body.
